

S P E E C H  
OF  
AARON F. PERRY, ESQ.,

DELIVERED BEFORE THE NATIONAL UNION ASSOCIATION,

*AT MOZART HALL, CINCINNATI, SEPT. 20, 1864.*

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MR. PRESIDENT, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,—The time has come to consider again whether it is for the public interest to continue the present Administration of the Federal Government in power for another period of four years or to change it. We shall have no difficulty in agreeing that this question should be decided, not on its bearings upon the fortunes of particular individuals, but upon its bearings on the fortunes of the Commonwealth. It should be decided, in other words, from public and not from private considerations.

You know that Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated President of the United States, on the 4th day of March, 1861. At that time so far as secession could break up and dissolve the Union, it had already been broken up, and the Union was dissolved. In the month of February preceding, there had been organized a Confederate Government, under a provisional Constitution, and a Confederate Congress had been held in Alabama.

The President elect, Mr. Jeff. Davis, had delivered on the 16th day of February, a public address in which he declared, that "the time for compromise has now passed, and the South is determined to maintain her position;" that "our separation from the old Union is complete,"—that no "Compromise, no re-construction is now to be entertained." In the meantime the navigation of the Mississippi had been blocked by hostile cannon. After the lapse of a few days the Confederate batteries were brought to bear upon Fort Sumter, and the Fort, after a few hours resistance, was compelled to surrender. Our country's flag—pardon me for necessarily alluding to a fact, which American men do not like to recall in the presence of American women—our country's flag was lowered.

Unless our Government had been already destroyed, unless we had already sunk into the deepest abyss of anarchy, there must have remained somewhere a power to decide what course of policy should be adopted concerning the war thus waged on the Government. If it were conceivable that more than one course of policy was open to us, the authority to choose a policy was in that portion of the Federal Congress remaining true to its duty, or it was in the Legislatures of the respective States remaining true to the Union, or it was in the people at large. There is no need of nice investigation in which of these it was lodged, because they all agreed with uncommon unanimity in the decision. There was scarcely dissent enough anywhere, to make itself heard. The Federal Congress, the State Legislatures and the people agreed that the war waged upon us should be resisted by war, and agreed to maintain the territorial integrity of the Union by force. (Cheers.) This course of policy having been determined upon by every tribunal which could be imagined to have a right to speak upon the subject, must be considered to have been determined for better or for worse. It is as true with Government as with the individual, that when in a difficult situation, a course of policy shall have been deliberately chosen, that course of policy must be adhered to.

For an individual to prove himself fickle, is to render it impossible for his friends to trust or assist him. For a Government to do so, is to expose itself to the derision and contempt of mankind.

This course of policy, then, having been determined upon by the State Legislatures and people at large, and by Congress, what was needed to carry out that determination?

In the first place, money was needed. In the United States Treasury, formerly so prosperous, nothing was to be found but a deficit.

In the next place, a Navy was wanted. The friends of the Rebellion, who had charge of the Government for the last four years, had contrived to annihilate the Navy or to appropriate it to their own purposes. For all practical purposes, one may say we had no Navy.

An Army was wanted. Our Army had been disbanded in part, and in part surrendered to the traitors.

In the next place, we had need of care and skill in our foreign relations; for there was manifest danger that through the instrumentality of a cotton famine, the diplomacy of France and Great Britain would be engaged in favor of the rebellion.

Let us now inquire for a moment what has been done to meet these wants. In the first place, and it may be stated in a few words, *that* able man who was placed at the head of the treasury department contrived to fish up from the bottom of the deficit money enough to carry on the vast operations of this war by sea and land.

In modern history, it has been thought, that the Administration of the younger Pitt of England was, in point of financial skill and command of resources, the model administration. He found resources for carrying on the wars, growing out of the French Revolution for a period of many years. But if we compare the amount which he was called upon to raise in any one, or in any three years, with the amount raised by our Treasury, during this Administration, the American administration will compare favorably with that of Pitt. Friends and enemies have awarded to Pitt and to our Secretary of the Treasury the reputation of genius. But allow me to say that the success was not, in either case, attributable to genius, but to a far higher quality than genius—I mean character.

In both countries money was abundant. What was needed above all, was character which would give assurance that the money when raised should be faithfully applied. Without dwelling any longer upon this part of the subject, I think it may be safely concluded that the administration of the treasury department has been a success. I do not allude to particular financial measures as meritorious or otherwise. In such great exigencies success must be attributed to the fact of having raised the money.

How is it with the Navy? I think that for all practical purposes, I may say that the war was commenced without a Navy. Some of our principal naval stations were also in the hands of the Rebels. Norfolk, Charleston, Mobile, Pensacola, New Orleans and Memphis were all in their hands. From ore then lying in its bed, and from timber then growing, a Navy has been constructed which can now stand against any Navy in the world; and what is more important is, *that* navy has so borne itself as to leave no temptation for any Navy in the world to attack it. (Tremendous applause.) Dupont, Porter, Foote, have more than renewed the early fame of McDonough, of Perry, of Bainbridge, and of Decatur. While Farragut—(loud cheers)—I say Farragut stands out from the rest in solid and almost solitary greatness. In the annals of modern naval achievement, the name of Nelson has been hitherto a leading name. He fought more battles than Farragut has yet fought. His celebrated battles of the Nile and of Trafalgar were fought with wooden ships. Immense political consequences depended upon these victories, and for that reason they became more famous than any others. But he himself regarded the attack on Copenhagen as his most daring exploit. The attack upon Copenhagen was the only one of Nelson's battles which, from its circumstances, can be compared with the exploits of Farragut. If you read the account of Nelson's attack upon

Copenhagen in connection with the attacks of Farragut on the defenses of New Orleans and the defenses of Mobile Bay, you will find that either of these exploits of Farragut will compare favorably with the most daring exploit of Nelson. They treasure the ashes of Nelson in a costly sarcophagus in the basement of St. Paul's in London. The basement is dark, but the sarcophagus is lighted continually by wax candles. He lost his life in the battle of Trafalgar over fifty-five years ago, but the candles are yet burning. I suppose they will not be permitted to die out until Great Britain shall cease to cherish her Navy. The career of Farragut is not yet ended; apparently there is yet more work for him to do. Distant, far distant be the hour when the spot for his final rest shall be chosen. Let it not, unless he shall so choose, be in any city. Let it be a sunny head-land overlooking the scene of some one of his exploits, where the stars of heaven may shine unobstructed upon the stars of the flag which he defended. (Tremendous applause.)

The Navy Department has been a success. The Army has sprung up as it were from the ground, and by its conduct has refuted the cavils of the enemies of popular government. It submits to discipline: it endures hardship; it fights. It conquers strongholds. It overcomes obstacles and moves on. The army compares to-day favorably with any army in the world. We have no account in ancient or modern times of armies more efficient than ours are now. Three years ago these soldiers and their officers were, for the most part, in their work shops, at the plow, or carrying on business in the avocations of civil life. They have been converted into solid regiments and brigades, which fight battles, seven days in succession and still move on. (Loud cheers for the army.) The War Department has been successfully administered.

The only remaining feature of the Administration necessary to be considered here to-night is the management of our foreign relations. It was natural for us to expect to receive the sympathy of Western Europe in this great struggle. Regarding it as we do, and as it truly is a great struggle for the principles of Christian civilization, we had a right to look for sympathy and moral support. We did not need material aid, nor did we ask for it. But we had not now to learn for the first time that a popular Democratic government has no friends among the princes and hereditary rulers of Europe. (Applause.) Schemes have been multiplied to involve France and England in war with us. Both of these governments have exhibited in various ways unfriendliness and have seemed willing to find pretexts for interfering in this struggle between us and the Rebellion. It is enough to say here, that all these pretexts for interference have been met, and we stand to-day free of all dangers of foreign interference. While we would naturally expect that our Diplomacy should assume a flexible form and should adapt itself to the exigencies of the occasion, we have not failed to enter our earnest protest against the unauthorized and unjustifiable proceedings of France in forcing Mexico to accept a monarchical government.

You have been told that Mr. Seward, our Secretary of State, had abandoned the Monroe Doctrine. This is a mistake. Mr. Seward has repeated the Monroe Doctrine and firmly asserted it, and you will find in the proceedings of the convention, which nominated Mr. Lincoln for re-election, the re-affirmance of the Monroe Doctrine in Mr. Monroe's own words.

I may say, then, that the duties of these Departments have been ably and successfully performed. Their objects have been generally and grandly accomplished. There has been no failure in these Departments.

Now I put to you the question, whether if it were a matter of private business, you would in such an emergency, displace a man who had well conducted important transactions and transfer them to a man who had no acquaintance with them? I put to you the question whether the government would not necessarily lose advantages by substituting other men who

have not had acquaintance with the difficulties, the dangers, and the duties of these Departments? The answer is too obvious to admit of any argument.

If we wish to change the Administration of the Government, it must be done from one of two motives. We may choose to make a radical change in the policy of the Government. You might choose to say that your previous decision on the course of policy of the Government was wrong, and that you would back out from it. In case you wish to say that, then you ought to change the men of the Administration; because you ought not to require those whom you have put forward to assert this policy to undertake a different policy. But, if you do not want any change of policy what other reason may there be to change the present Administration?—Now, if you were assured that you could put in a new Administration, which would administer the Government in the same general line of policy equally well and with equal ability, still the argument would be against it. You must be assured that you could put in the Administration an amount of ability to equal it, and at the same time to surpass it so far, as to balance the disadvantages which you will necessarily incur in making the change. What is proposed to us? Is it claimed by any intelligent man that Gen. McClellan presents to us those superior Administrative abilities which invite us to change the Government and place it in his hands for that reason? I do not know that they are making any such pretensions for him. Such pretensions would be simply ludicrous. The most that is claimed for General McClellan, so far as I know is:—That he is a man of intelligence in military affairs, and, that if he had not been interfered with, and if mistakes had not been made by President Lincoln, or by other military men, he, Gen. McClellan, might have been more successful. That he *has* been successful nobody claims, and there is then no ground to claim that Gen. McClellan has shown high Administrative abilities. The claim that he possesses such abilities is a claim not yet tested. It is said that if he had a fair chance to prove himself an able man he might do so. What man in the history of the world has ever had such a chance for public service as Gen. McClellan has had? Napoleon had not—Wellington had not—Washington had not. If McClellan had not a chance, pray what kind of a chance can he ever have? (Cheers.) I hold in my hand a history of the Peninsula campaign which was written by Prince de Joinville. The Prince and his two Nephews accompanied Gen. McClellan and his army during the campaign. After their return to France the Prince wrote a history of that Campaign, which is frequently alluded to as a favorable, and eulogistic account of Gen. McClellan's military management. I shall, by and by, read you some passages from this book. The only particular in which it is favorable to McClellan, is its criticisms upon the Government. The writer obviously did not look upon him as an energetic commander. I have said, that possibly, mistakes were committed by the Administration, or, by the military men who advised the President. It was a new business both to the President and his advisers. In the nature of the case mistakes could not have been prevented. I am not now going into a detailed discussion for the purpose of arguing the case. Let us suppose that McClellan might have done better had he not been interfered with by the Government. I have before me a pamphlet written by a distinguished lawyer of New York, reviewing the Report of a Congressional Committee on the management of the Campaign. It is written in the interests of McClellan, and is both able and zealous. Let us see where he places the responsibility?

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"I am not willing to believe, for I have not sufficient evidence of the fact, that the President himself has not at all times been willing and desirous of bringing the war to a close by subduing the enemy; but I have what I deem sufficient evidence that prominent members of his own party, near to his person, had no desire that Gen. McClellan should take Richmond, but, on the contrary, labored to prevent such conquest, and that these persons so operated by

their influence on the President as to make him an instrument in carrying out their designs. This I charge."

You will observe that the writer acquits the President of any wrong purpose, but claims that he was wrongly advised by persons near him who had influence over him. But blame is imputed to the President that he did not place more confidence in McClellan, and that he called about him other military men for consultation.

My friends, is it possible for a man to feel more confidence in another than he does feel? Is confidence a thing that can be forced, a thing of choice? Did not the President place in the hands of McClellan at first, almost unlimited power and unlimited confidence? For months there was no limit to the confidence in Gen. McClellan, but at length a feeling of hesitation and uncertainty took possession of the minds of the people, and perhaps of the President. It was found that the army was lying there month after month doing nothing—proposing nothing. I beg your pardon, something was done—The literary branch of the business of war was attended to. We had bulletins how to do it, and bulletins how not to do it; proclamations followed by reviews, and reviews followed by proclamations; but no tendency to fight the enemy was discovered.

If the President felt obliged to call about him other men and compare views, I think we should not hold him accountable for it. (Applause.) The prevailing impression was that he did not call those advisers one moment too soon. Possibly some mistakes were made by the President and his advisers. While speaking of possibilities let me allude to one other possibility. Is it not possible that this man McClellan was a bubble—a phantasm? (Cheers.) Was not his reputation kindled and did it not blaze highest at a time when the country was in an agony of hunger for a great General? And as starving men imagine to themselves feasts and luxuries, is it not possible the people imagined for McClellan the qualities they so much needed to find? I do not know on what facts the writer grounds his charge that other men near the President labored to prevent McClellan from taking Richmond. I have read his pamphlet with care, and it would require something more than steam power to draw such an inference from any facts he has stated. If there were such persons they were no better than the men of the Chicago Convention.

There has been a negation of thought rather than a thought, an absence of idea rather than an idea, which has been frequently put forward as a thought or idea. It is a shadowy resemblance, a nebulous suggestion of an idea, not easy to define, because the moment it approaches definiteness of expression it escapes, and is found to be an illusion. While it is admitted that the territorial integrity of the Union can be restored only by successful war and by forcibly overcoming the rebellion, it seems to be imagined that we must obtain the consent of the rebellion to be overcome. That it must be crushed; but, in order to crush it, we should contrive to persuade it to let itself be crushed. From certain quarters, we have heard at every step of the war, how extremely dangerous and appalling it might be to get the rebellion exasperated, so that its consent to be beaten could not be expected. A leading theme of complaint against the present Administration has been, that it has proved itself so ungracious to this rebellion, its consent to be overpowered cannot reasonably be looked for. I infer from Gen. McClellan's letter of acceptance that he has not recovered from the impression manifested in his early orders and proclamations, that it is an unsafe thing to "exasperate" the South. (Boisterous applause.) You may remember the character of Barnardine in Measure for Measure. He was a malefactor, in prison, under sentence of death. The time for his execution had been several times fixed, but he had managed to obtain a reprieve. The clown of the play took up the conceit that the execution depended upon Barnardine's consent. The time for his execution having again arrived, the clown was sent to wake up the criminal. He thumped vigorously at the door of the cell, and was answered—"A pox o' your throats! Who makes that noise there? What are you?"

CLOWN.—“Your friend, Sir, the hangman; you must be so good, sir, to rise and be put to death.” (Great laughter.)

It seems to be thought, by some people, expedient that our Generals should keep up a similar dialogue with this rebellion. They would have war, uncommonly vigorous war, they say, but without reliance on physical force. They would incur all the expense in money and in life, incident to genuine war, but would act on the theory of gaining victories chiefly by consent of the opposing forces. They concede that negotiation was exhausted before war commenced, so that an appeal to bayonets and cannon was unavoidable. But they think a mistake has been made in not putting a sweet-cake on the point of every bayonet, and in not loading your cannon with poultices. If you want to go back to that kind of a war, I know no reason why you should not trust Gen. McClellan. (Cheers and laughter.) Otherwise you may conclude that it is as well to go on with Grant, Sherman and Farragut.

Let me call your attention to the fact which you very well know, that the chief complaints—the chief opposition to the present Administration come from a party which is organized with two wings. One of these wings, and the one which I suppose has the greatest vitality, believes and advocates the belief that from the beginning it has been utterly impossible to break down the Rebellion by war, and therefore it is quite useless to attempt it. That is the doctrine of the peace branch of the Democratic party. The other branch of that party tells us that it *is* possible, and that it ought to have been long ago crushed if we had had a good Administration. I think we may safely leave them to combat with each other. No claim is presented which can justify a change of Administration on the ground of greater efficiency in carrying out the policy which was decided upon with so much unity and emphasis. If we make a change we must find a reason for it in some proposed change of policy.

What then is that party organization which urges a change, what is its policy? It is common, and, I suppose it is necessary that those persons who agree upon substantial points of policy, should unite together and organize themselves so as to be able to carry out their principles, and in such an organization it is always necessary that minor points should be subordinated to the great leading points of policy upon which they all agree. But here is a party one half of which is for peace and the other half for war. The party itself is split by a chasm which is as broad as an impassible gulf. We have a candidate for President who tells us that he is for war and a candidate for Vice-President who is for peace, and if it should happen that they should both be elected and continue in the same theories, they would be compelled in the Administration to oppose each other as much as they oppose us. What public services can a party promise which presents itself to us in such aspects? What assurance can they feel or give to others that they can do anything except to disorganize the public service? A party, the two wings of which are irrevocably pledged to defeat each other! Suppose that a Congress were elected equally divided, what service could they expect to perform? Is it not apparent that this combination is not for public purposes, but for private objects? Is it not perfectly conclusive, that it is not to serve the country, but to serve persons? What is it better than a political debauch? What is it better than an act of miscegenation publicly and indecently performed?

But, is that the worst of it? Are we at liberty to leave it thus and simply call it a debauch? Can such a party of men assemble as was assembled at Chicago without having some purpose of influencing public affairs? Can such an assemblage get together without having some influence upon the interests of the country? Let us then ask ourselves which side was that assemblage intended to strengthen and encourage? Was the effect of it to support and encourage the Government of the United States or was the effect of it to support and encourage the Confederate Government? It must have been intended to exert an influence one way or the other. It is impossible for such a crowd of persons to assemble without some influence. We will not inquire too much into the motives. We cannot enter into the hearts of men. But it is both lawful and charitable to ascribe to

men purposes which their conduct seems intended to accomplish. If that Convention would, naturally, contribute to the reputation and strength of the Government of the United States, we must suppose that such was its motive. If it would naturally, encourage and prolong the rebellion we must suppose that such was its motive.

We can have no other or fairer test.

I propose, if you will consent, that we will make an imaginary journey.

You know that August Belmont is the Chairman of the National Executive Democratic Committee. We will imagine, if you please, that Mr. Belmont wishes to ascertain where that Convention could be satisfactorily held, and he will therefore proceed to Richmond to see if there can be any objection to its being held in Richmond. The last preceding Democratic Convention was held in Charleston. The party there split apart on questions infinitely little compared with the question about which the two wings of that party differ to-day. They conclude this time they will hold the convention a little further North, and accordingly we will imagine that Mr. Belmont goes to Richmond. It is well to have a distinct idea how we shall appear in this imaginary journey, and how we are to travel. I propose to invite you to accompany Mr. Belmont in a journey over the scenes of the Peninsular Campaign. I will read a passage sent me by a friend and taken from a correspondent of the *New York Post*, writing from Newport:—

"The equipage that throws all others in the shade, and causes them to 'pale their ineffectual fires,' is that of the aforementioned Chairman of the Democratic National Committee. It consists of a low barouche drawn by four elegant and fiery 'thorough-breds,' with postilions mounted on the left or 'near' horse of each pair. Two footmen in extreme livery are suspended from a high seat on the back of the carriage, technically called the 'ramble.' The barouche is lined with rich satin damask, and the outside trimmings are of heavy gilt. The postilions are dressed in buckskin breeches and high top boots, with black silk velvet jackets and caps highly ornamented with gold lace. The men are peculiarly well formed, having been selected and trained in Europe, with especial reference to their 'build,' and the extra size of their 'calves.' Their livery is imported at a cost of about one thousand dollars a suit, and the cost of the whole affair may be conjectured when I state that the horses are valued at twenty-five thousand dollars, the carriage at five thousand dollars, and the harness and other trappings at three thousand dollars. When the royal *cortege* makes its appearance on the avenue, with the democratic prince in full costume, all other vehicles instinctively give way, as though the occupant was indeed a 'crowned head.'"

With such an outfit I think we may hope for a pleasant ride. Let us enhance the interest of the journey, by taking along an authentic history of the campaign, which is tolerably impartial, and which so far as it leans at all leans to a friendly interest in the fortunes of Gen. McClellan. We will select the history written by the Prince de Joinville, who, with his two nephews, were with Gen. McClellan during the campaign. He disposes of the long delay while the army lay before Washington, by general remarks concerning the difficulties which Americans find in taking the initiative. They wait, he thinks, one for another. Arriving before Yorktown, let us see what he says of the siege, (Page 27): "On these ramparts had been sealed with the blood of our soldiers, an alliance, which had never belied itself, and to which the United States had owed their prosperity and their grandeur. Apart from the emotion with which meeting thus afar, *souvenirs* of national glory, apart from the interest with which I sought traces of military scenes of which I had known some of the actors, I asked myself if, by a strange caprice of fate, these same ramparts should not see undone the work of 1781, and if, from the slowness of the new siege of Yorktown was not to come, the ruin of the great republic, and the destruction of the Franco-American alliance."

At Williamsburg, we read his account of the battle, which it is obvious, he looks upon as scarcely managed at all. He is forcibly impressed with the need on our part of a better organization of the staff of the army, and doubts if an American army can be made truly manageable and effective for want of what he calls "Hierarchy." From Williamsburg to the Chickahominy, he says, their maximum days march was two leagues, about six miles per day and presented the appearance of an armed emigration.

After speaking of the rains—of the swollen condition of the Chickahominy—and the delays in fitting the bridges thrown across—he says: "*And days, very precious days, fled, thus! Perhaps, let us say it frankly, they were not in so great a hurry to act as they might have been.*"

He tells how McClellan threw one wing of his army across the Chickahominy, retaining the other on the other side, so that the army was separated by that difficult stream; how a storm of rain fell, and the rebel commander expecting a deluge, which would prevent the two wings from assisting each other, attacked, defeated, and nearly destroyed, that part of the army between the Chickahominy and Richmond; how Sumner got across and saved it. He inquires whether the whole army should not have been sent across, and considers the advantages as well as difficulties of such a movement, concluding thus:

"But the stake was so great, the occasion presented was so unexpected and so favorable for playing a decisive part, that nothing, in my opinion, should have prevented attempting at any price, this operation. Here again, they carry the penalty of that American slowness, which belongs much more to the character of the army than to that of its chief. It was not until seven o'clock in the evening, that they resolved to establish without delay, all the bridges, and to cause the whole army to pass at day-break to the right bank of the Chickahominy. It was too late. Four hours had been lost, and the occasion, that instant so fleeting, in war more than anywhere else, had flown."

He then describes the second days battle, near Fair Oaks, and says, [page 44]:—

"When at noon the firing ceased, the confederates, weary of the long struggle which they had sustained, and being no longer commanded, were in a state of inextricable confusion, let it be imagined what might have happened if, at this moment, the thirty-five thousand fresh troops left on the other bank of the Chickahominy had appeared on the flank of this disorderly mass, after having happily crossed the bridges."

And again, [pages 49 and 50]:—

"The Federals had had the defensive battle which they desired, had repulsed the enemy, taken a General, and made a goodly number of prisoners, but, *stopped by natural obstacles which were not insurmountable, they had drawn no advantage from their success.* In reality they had failed on both sides, for want of organization, for want of hierarchy, for want of the bond which results from it, between the soul of the chief and that great body which they call an army, a powerful bond which permits a General to demand of his soldiers, and to obtain from them blindly those extraordinary efforts which gain battles. Nevertheless, although the losses of the enemy were more considerable than those of the Federals, the miscarriage was above all baleful for the latter; *they had lost an unique occasion to strike a decisive blow.* These occasions do not return, and besides, in the circumstances in which they found themselves, the season was against them."

Observe that whatever mistakes had been committed by the President, they did not affect this "*unique occasion,*" when our army was stopped by "*obstacles not insurmountable,*" and lost a favorable chance to play a decisive part, in which they were not in so great a hurry as they ought to have been, and when days, very precious days were allowed to slip away unimproved. Observe also that the peculiar "bond" which was claimed to exist between McClellan

and his army was not then visible. The failure is imputed to want of "hierarchy," and to "American slowness." Have you heard of any "American slowness" or any want of "hierarchy" in the armies of Sherman, or Grant? (Prolonged applause.)

Mr. Belmont, having arrived in Richmond, we will suppose, is admitted to an interview with Jefferson Davis. You will understand that the interview, like the journey is imaginary. The object is to ascertain if Davis will allow the Convention to be held in Richmond.

[NOTE BY THE REPORTER.—The following parts of the speech, thrown into the shape of a dialogue, for the convenience of reporting, were pronounced by the speaker as a colloquy, in which he signified by gestures, and other means, not easily reported, the person represented; the audience following the changes with intense interest, only broken by frequent cheers and applause.]

DAVIS.—Did I not meet you in Charleston, at the last Convention, Mr. Belmont?

BELMONT.—I had the pleasure of meeting you there and have met you elsewhere. I thank you for the honor of this interview, and wish to inquire if you will permit us to hold our next Convention in Richmond?

DAVIS.—It is important to know the kind of Convention you propose. Our old Democratic Conventions used to be pretty well arranged beforehand. Perhaps you can give me an inside view of your intended proceedings.

BELMONT.—I can. No Convention was ever more perfectly arranged beforehand. The platform has been shown to your Agents in Canada, and their suggestions were entertained in framing it. It is not long. Every word of it has been chosen with care, criticised, weighed, measured and left in its place, because it is the word wanted. There is not a careless syllable in it. With your permission, I will read it to you.

DAVIS.—Before doing so, I wish to make a few general inquiries. Please inform me whether it contains anything hostile to me or to the Confederacy?

BELMONT.—Nothing of that kind.

DAVIS.—Does it express or hint any disapprobation of what you call the rebellion, or impute blame to us who got it up?

BELMONT.—Not a breath—not a syllable, Mr. President. (Laughter.)

DAVIS.—Does it in any way encourage the Federal Armies, or propose to strengthen or assist them?

BELMONT.—Far from it, I assure you. (Laughter.)

DAVIS.—How is it in regard to Maximilian and his new Monarchy in Mexico, any objection to his proceedings there?

BELMONT.—Not a whisper, Mr. President.

DAVIS.—So far, very well. But how will it be with your speakers in the Convention and out of it?

BELMONT.—Mr. President, no Convention was ever more perfectly understood beforehand in all its parts. The actors have had some—delicacy—about taking parts until they had seen the play, and knew what other actors they were to play to. There has been a necessity for uncommonly careful rehearsals. I not only know the speakers for inside and out, but I understand perfectly the *spirit* which will prevail in that assemblage. I have no hesitation in assuring you that nothing, absolutely nothing, will be said which can be unpleasant to you or your friends. I do not limit this to the speakers. You may send your detectives among the crowd, and they will hear nothing unfriendly or disrespectful to you or the Confederacy.

DAVIS.—Let us proceed then to the Platform.

BELMONT.—(Reads first Resolution.)

*Resolved*, That in the future, as in the past, we will adhere with unswerving fidelity to the Union under the Constitution as the only solid foundation of our strength, security and happiness as a people, and as a framework of government equally conducive to the welfare and prosperity of all the States, both Northern and Southern.

DAVIS.—What you have said concerning the care with which the language is chosen makes me notice that the resolution does not absolutely promise to adhere to the Constitution, but only to adhere "*in the future as in the past.*" If I am right in my facts I can appreciate the propriety, not to say felicity of the qualification. At the time I refer to, I was absent from

Washington, and much occupied with what Lincoln calls the rebellion. But I understood that the leaders who will figure in this Convention, were in favor of allowing us of the South to amend the Constitution until it should be satisfactory to us. They claimed that the war could be honorably avoided and a reasonable arrangement made, on the idea that it would have been both reasonable and honorable to allow us to amend the Constitution to suit us. Am I right as to facts?

BELMONT.—You are. The facts are on record and indisputable.

DAVIS.—If your platform should carry, and we should negotiate an arrangement, you could then allow us to amend the Constitution to suit us, and still adhere to it "*as in the past.*" Indeed this phrase would seem to signify a purpose of that kind. Am I right?

BELMONT.—The language is before you. I am not authorized, Mr. President, to interpret it.

DAVIS.—Proceed, Mr. Belmont.

BELMONT.—(Reads second resolution.) "*Resolved*, That this Convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American people, that after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war, during which, under the pretense of military necessity, or war power, higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, and public liberty, and private right alike trodden down, and the material prosperity of the Country essentially impaired, justice, humanity, liberty and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of all the States, or other peaceable means, to the end that, at the earliest practicable moment, peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States."

DAVIS.—A good deal of language there, Mr. Belmont. Let us have it more in detail, clause by clause. How do you count the "four years of failure?" Do you count back to the last Democratic Convention at Charleston, or how do you get it? Lincoln will not have been in office four years until March, 1865; and it was sometime after he got in before he could do much. We had fixed him so that he could hardly stir for awhile. How do you count it?

BELMONT.—The resolution will be read abroad and at home by many who have not kept track of dates. It is not actually true, but there is no harm in making the statement roundly. Nobody in that Convention, or who is likely to act with us, will object to a little extravagance in statements imputing instability to our Government, or inefficiency to our arms.—Call it four years, Mr. President.

DAVIS.—The word "*failure*" is happily chosen. Mr. Secretary Benjamin and myself have had difficulty to make our soldiers and people understand it that way. We can now show them that the people of the North, and the world at large, understand it as we do. Failure is the right word. Of course, the part taken by the Federal navy and armies at New Orleans, Vicksburg, Memphis, Port Hudson, Ft. Donalson, Port Royal, Stone River, Millspring, Chattanooga, Missionary Ridge, Pea Ridge, Mobile Bay, Atlanta, Gettysburg, Knoxville, The Weldon Railroad, The Wilderness, &c., &c., being failures, our part was just the reverse. You are right, Mr. Belmont, the words are carefully chosen. No accident could have been so happy. Benjamin and I have always said so. Sherman retreated on Atlanta, and Grant retreats on Richmond.—I am interested.—What comes next? Here I see another magnificent selection of words—"the *experiment of war.*" The experiment having failed, of course the Lincoln Government is in a pickle. Excuse me, my friend, I like this more than—more than—I expected. It is really superb—"public liberty and private rights alike trodden down;" why that is worse than my people talk of me. To tell the truth, the principles of public law applicable to a state of domestic war, and the principles which fix limits to executive authority, during an insurrection, have not been heretofore much studied or well understood by our public men. There is a wide margin for honest difference of opinion; but I observe you do not charge your Government with an occasional stepping over the limits of legal authority, but "*the constitution has been disregarded in every part;*" "*public liberty and private right alike trodden down.*" In other words you have no lawful government. Every man is absolved from respecting, obeying. The doors of anarchy are wide open to you; and her attractive brood of assassinations, insurrections, revolts, tumults, are within every man's reach. It is purely a question of convenience, whether any man shall obey, or fight such a government. There can be no moral or legal obligation to submit to it; none whatever. I have violated only a few provisions of the old Constitution. Lincoln has disregarded every part of it. It would follow naturally enough that your Convention would prefer me to him. The resolution speaks of having in view, on your side, an ultimate Convention of all the States. Please say, if it is such another as the Peace Conference, called by Virginia, just before Lincoln was inaugurated? If I remember right, every Free State East of the Rocky Mountains was there to negotiate. We, of the Confederacy, were not present; except some

border States which had not then openly joined us. I think that was what would be called a Convention of all the States, and if so, I have no objection to its being repeated. I like the resolution on another account. It tends to make your government appear contemptible abroad. Do you think your Government would expose itself to the derision of mankind by allowing such charges to be publicly made against it? Would not Lincoln put you all under arrest?

BELMONT.—He cannot be counted on to do it or not to do it. He has some low cunning, and has always hit us wrong. When we want him to make arrests he won't do it. When we do not want him to, he will. He is very odious.

DAVIS.—You shall not be arrested in Richmond, unless your other resolutions are more objectionable. Whatever fear Lincoln may have of your Convention, I can see no occasion for me to fear it. Let us look further. The resolution says that "*justice*," and several other things, demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities. "*Justice*" demands it. That, I think, is correct. The States had a legal right to secede, and your war to prevent it is unjust. Is that the meaning?

BELMONT.—I have already said that you must look to the language itself. I am not authorized to construe it.

DAVIS.—Why! if justice demands immediate cessation of hostilities, it must be because the war is unjust. Being unjust, you will expect, in case we negotiate a peace, to assume the war debt you have unjustly compelled us to incur. You will indemnify us for the unjust spoliation of this unjust war. You will help us erect monuments to those men who have fallen in battle, endeavoring to resist this injustice. You will, honor us who fought this good fight. Is it not so?

BELMONT.—There is the language of the resolution. You need no further assurance, Mr. President, that it was deliberate.

DAVIS.—Proceed.

BELMONT.—(Reads the third resolution.) "*Resolved*, That the direct interference of the military authority of the United States in the recent elections held in Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri and Delaware, was a shameful violation of the Constitution, and a repetition of such acts in the approaching election will be held as revolutionary, and resisted with all the means and power under our control.

DAVIS.—Still better. Here you begin to talk of resistance, like men! I am not quite posted as to the acts complained of in Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri and Delaware, but I suspect it refers to the arrests, and other proceedings, by McClellan, and others, to prevent what they call disloyal persons from being elected to office?

BELMONT.—I do not know precisely what is referred to, but I think that is it.

DAVIS.—There has been a manifest purpose to try to keep my friends out of office. In the former resolutions, where you speak of the Constitution being disregarded in "*every part*," you do not point at violence, though you make a case in which violence might be expected. Here, when you contemplate the repeated outrages on my friends, I perceive that blood is thicker than water after all, for you openly threaten resistance. Well! I have had some trials. I thank you kindly for so much consideration. Aside from this, the resolution is the work of a man who knows how to secure practical advantages. The people are encouraged to look to their Government as an enemy, to expect outrages, and to be prepared for resistance. They look, of course, to their leaders to tell them when the act has happened which calls for insurrection. This is the way we managed it in the South, and it worked admirably. People easily believe what they have been led to expect. Besides we did as you have done, charged the revolution upon the Government. They are more vigilant now. You may find it awkward, perhaps impracticable, to start much of an insurrection. But the fact of such a thing being threatened by a large convention, will strike a blow at the credit of your Government, and do it as much harm as forcible resistance. Proceed.

BELMONT.—(Reads fourth resolution.) "*Resolved*, That the aim and object of the Democratic party is to preserve the Federal Union, and the rights of the States unimpaired, and they hereby declare, that they consider the administrative usurpation of extraordinary and dangerous powers not granted by the Constitution; the subversion of the civil by military law in States not in insurrection; the arbitrary military arrest, imprisonment, trial and sentence of American citizens in States, where civil law exists in full force; the suppression of freedom of speech and of the press; the denial of the right of asylum; the open and avowed disregard of State rights; the employment of unusual test oaths, and the interference with, and denial of, the right of the people to bear arms, as calculated to prevent a restoration

of the Union, and a perpetuation of a Government deriving its just powers from the consent of the governed."

DAVIS.—The aim of the Democratic party to preserve the "*rights of the States*," is the same as my aim. I do not share your wishes to preserve the Federal Union, but do not object to any thing of that sort while State rights are conceded. Because, with State rights acknowledged, we can go out when we please. When the elections go to suit us, we will be satisfied to stay in. When they do not go to suit us, we will step out. We cannot be expected to submit to a majority, when it disregards our wishes. We are not slaves. I notice you allude a second time, and with emphasis, to "*the open and avowed disregard of State rights*." I do not desire any stronger language. All we at the South want is, what is reasonable. This resolution complains again, and justly, of military arrests of my friends, of persons who defend me, who assert the rights of the Confederacy, who bring me information, who discourage enlistments among the Lincoln hirelings and encourage desertions. It justly stigmatizes the permission of your Government to carry off a negro stealer from New York to the country where his theft was committed, as "denial of the right of asylum." Perhaps, it is not quite clear on the principles of public law, that a murderer, forger, pirate or other criminal who escapes from justice in his own country, has an indefeasible "right of Asylum" in this country. But the case referred to in the resolution was the case of an innocent man fleeing from persecution. All he had done was to steal some niggers, who were free, and sell them into slavery. Yet he was given up. Who could have imagined, ten years ago, that the United States of America would ever come to that! Thank God! It is not my fault. We, at the South, may be exterminated, but we will never submit. "The employment of unusual test oaths" you have also stigmatized, as it deserves. Lincoln brutality compels my friends and the friends of the Confederacy, inside his lines, to take the oath of allegiance. It is unconstitutional and binds nobody, and is so generally understood; but there are a few over susceptible persons who stumble at it. The "interference with and denial of the right of the people to bear arms," refers, I suppose, to the outrage recently committed in Indiana, of spying on the proceedings of a secret organization of our friends there, and breaking up their plans for arming themselves against the Lincoln tyranny. Am I right? (9)

BELMONT.—I had no idea that you noticed our politics so closely.

DAVIS.—A man in my situation does not rest on a bed of roses. Few movements escape me. The time may come when I can show my friends how well I know all they have done, suffered or attempted. Let us see the next resolution.

BELMONT.—(Reads the fifth resolution.)

*Resolved*, That the shameful disregard of the Administration in its duty, in respect to our fellow-citizens, who now and long have been prisoners of war in a suffering condition, deserves the severest reprobation on the score alike of public and common humanity.

DAVIS.—Mr. Belmont, I have had some apprehension that our mode of treating prisoners of war would expose us to—to the necessity of explanations. The close, filthy rooms, insufficient and unwholesome food, want of clothing, sickness, &c., might attract the observation of our friends in other countries and temporarily injure us. It never occurred to me before, that your Government was chargeable with this suffering. The author of that resolution is a man of genius. The opinion of a mass Convention of northern people, putting all the blame on your government, and imputing none to mine, for those dreadful emaciations, is opportune. What other witnesses can I need to defend myself abroad. I am more than ever satisfied that not one word of your platform has been accidentally put in so far. Is there any more?

BELMONT.—One more resolution. (Reading the sixth and last resolution.) "*Resolved*, That the sympathy of the Democratic party is heartily and earnestly extended to the soldiery of our army who are and have been in the field, under the flag of our Country, and, in the event of attaining the power, they will receive all the care, protection, regard and kindness that the brave soldiers of the Republic so nobly earned."

DAVIS.—The soldiers will undoubtedly be objects of sympathy, should your platform succeed. I observe again the same careful choice of words. You do not propose to honor or compensate the soldiery, but to extend sympathy. In this, I will cordially join you. They may look for sympathy even in the South, but for honor and reward nowhere. Is there not one mistake of language at last, at the close? I suppose you mean that the soldiery will receive care and protection, &c.: but nicely criticised it would seem to declare that it is the Democratic party which "will receive all the care, protection, regard and kindness that the brave soldiers of the Republic so nobly earned." This I think was not the intention, but it is the grammatical construction of the sentence. If you succeed, Mr. Belmont, this last clause,

so construed, may prove the greatest prophecy of the whole. You have my best wishes that it may. I consent to your Convention. But before we drop the subject, let me remark that I notice in the resolutions considerable stress is laid on freedom of speech. What sense is that to be understood in?

BELMONT.—I have said that the platform must construe itself; but your question reminds me of a letter received from an influential friend in Cincinnati, which I had nearly forgotten. I will read an extract which may help you. (Reads:) "Should you have difficulty in persuading an august person to permit our Convention to be held in Richmond, please say to him that a little before, but about the time of the commencement of the war, Mr. Yancey was here to speak in the interests of the rebellion. That we procured for him Pike's Opera House, and cheered him with unstinted applause. After the speech, we gave him a complimentary supper at the Burnet House. Not far from the time of the speech of the lamented Yancey, Wendell Phillips endeavored to make a speech in the same house. We mobbed Phillips, hurled our sentiments at him in the shape of rotten eggs, and broke up his meeting; he being a sectional man. Tell Mr. Davis, that we maintain to this moment, through every persecution, the same unshaken devotion to freedom of speech which inspired us then." (Tumultuous and prolonged cheers.)

BELMONT.—Then follows, Mr. President, in the letter, what is called a rhetorical burst, but as you have given me so much time that is valuable to your country, I will omit that.

DAVIS.—Let us have the rhetoric by all means. I know of nothing more important to the Confederacy at this time than your Convention. Let me hear it.

BELMONT.—(Reads further from the letter.) "Tell Mr. Davis that a babe may be kept from its mother's bosom, but that we, who feasted Yancey and mobbed Phillips, cannot be kept from the bosom of that Convention." (Tremendous applause.)

DAVIS.—Mr. Belmont, be so good as to make my compliments to your Cincinnati friends. I see that they have the true Southern idea of freedom of speech; and say to them that when they come to Richmond they must call and see me. I have no objection to grant your request to hold the Convention in Richmond. If convenient to your speakers, I will draw up my brigades, and would like to have them addressed as generally as circumstances will permit.

[Here the Speaker, by a movement, signified that Mr. Belmont had taken his leave and was retiring, when Mr. Davis, struck by a new thought, beckoned him back, and in a cordial but deferential manner renewed the conversation.]

DAVIS.—Mr. Belmont, I have been so much interested, I may say charmed with the liberality of your efforts in this matter, that if you would pardon me for taking a personal liberty with you—I assure you that I claim no answer, and am well aware it is a liberty; but if you will allow me, Mr. Belmont, to inquire.—*What is your motive for engaging in these transactions?*

BELMONT.—(Placing one hand on each of his trowsers pockets, with solemnity.) Mr. President, it is with me a matter of feeling! It is sentiment! (striking his pockets with emphasis.) (Loud and continued cheering.) Mr. President, I observe from your question that you are aware of the liberalizing tendency of practical finance. Gentlemen who spend the better portion of their lives in the upper financial circles learn to rise above the narrowness of special adhesions, and of local attachments. To us one political party is like another; one country like another; one cause like another—in short one dollar is like another. To us St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, Paris, London, New York, are all the same. We have in our vocations, as in others, manipulators and artisans who are discouraged and hindered by difficulties; but with our men of genius, as with others, difficulties invite the largest play of their faculties, and they find their pleasure in overcoming them. Allow me to say, Mr. President, that the gathering together of the scattered fragments of an old party, not yet entirely rid of the sturdy traditions of the days of Madison and of Jackson; the getting of them all down, grovelling and eating an humble pie like *that*, (holding out the Chicago Platform)—I say, Mr. President, it required a higher style of financial management, than a mere time subscription. (Great applause.) Besides, Mr. Davis, when this war compelled a public loan of ten hundred, fifteen hundred, two thousand millions of dollars, it offered one of the finest financial nuts to crack that has been seen for generations. This Administration threw it all—all, I say every dollar, into the vulgar mud puddle of a popular subscription. I trust I need not say, that I have some sense of the dignity of my vocation. How, then, could I feel anything but aversion or disgust at the financial management of such an Administration? Jay Cook is said, I know, to have made something out of it; that is, something for a parvenu, a novice; but it was nothing, absolutely nothing compared with what ought to have

been made on such a loan, if handled in any of the highest styles of the art. So much, Mr. President, for the past. I look also to the future. You have done me the honor to invite this part of our conversation on confidential terms, and will therefore excuse me for speaking openly. I mean no offence, and I speak only from a financial stand point. I am not a military man. I pretend only to speak as a financier. Frankly then, Mr. Davis, it appears to me, that unless Lincoln's Administration can be got out of the way, your confederacy is on its last legs. I beg your pardon—I can't help seeing it in that light. (Applause.) To finish up and restore the territorial integrity of the Union, may cost five hundred, or a thousand millions more. But it will be money owed by the people of the country to themselves. As between individuals, one may pay and another receive, but as to the country at large, it will be taking money from one pocket and putting it in the other. I see in all this nothing but a simple, vulgar, mechanical operation. So far as the practice of my art is concerned, there might very nearly as well have been no war at all. (Laughter and cheers.) On the other hand, an armistice, if it comes in time, lights up the whole future with transcendent brightness. It must come soon, I know, to be of any use. The platform which we have read together, proposes it shall be immediate and unconditional. Gen. McClellan's letter of acceptance puts the armistice on a little contingency. It is to be only "so soon as it is clear, or even *probable*," that you are "ready for peace on the basis of the Union." You will pardon the liberty, Mr. President, which as a financier, I cannot help taking of putting some estimate on your sagacity. You are not likely to let a great movement be balked for want of an appearance of probability. Nor will Gen. McClellan be likely, with his party demanding an unconditional armistice, to construe the indications of probability strongly against their wishes. I assume that, if he shall be elected, the armistice is just as inevitable as if he had mentioned no condition. Then what comes? Gen. McClellan says, that then "We should exhaust all the resources of statesmanship." On his plan, the effort on the part of the North is to be, not only frank and earnest, but "*persistent*." The platform looks to a convention of all the States; and he probably includes that as among the resources of statesmanship which are to be exhausted. Mr. President, my enthusiasm kindles at the splendors which light this course of policy. You will of course go into a convention only when its basis of representation, the subjects committed to it, and its plan of procedure shall have been satisfactorily adjusted. There being no Constitutional or legal provision for such a convention, all its details will be subject to popular discussion and arrangement. Six months time would be short for getting it assembled, and when assembled it would have no legal character. It might represent the country. It might represent a party. It might represent a mob. Its deliberations commenced, you would propose, as fundamental principles, the Chicago platform, viz: the legal right of a State to secede; the legal wrong of the war; the fact, that in making that war, the Federal Constitution had been disregarded in every part, that public liberty and private right had been alike trampled under foot. These principles and facts having been asserted in the platform and indorsed by a popular election, could no longer be disputed. The logical result would be, that the war debt of the Federal Government, and all its war measures, were illegal and unconstitutional—in short, the work of a mob. It would also logically follow, that your war debt, and war measures, in defence of State rights, being just and legal, ought to be assumed by the Federal Government: and you ought to be indemnified for spoliation and damages occasioned by the war. This would be the logical necessity of the situation. But perhaps you would be conciliatory and concede more than they could logically claim. You would place both war debts on the same footing, and the claims for spoliation North and South to stand on the same footing. Well! here would be topics for debate. Your convention would sit nobody knows how long. If it should recommend anything, these recommendations would lack the force of law, and more time and controversy would be consumed in trying to get the recommendations framed into laws. It would all result in compromise or a failure to compromise. In case of a compromise, there would be claims, regular and irregular, funded and unfunded, new issues and old issues over-topping each other like the peaks of Himalaya! It would be in a financial point of view splendid beyond description, sublime. Well! let us imagine a failure to compromise, after time had been taken to exhaust the resources of Statesmanship; after persistent efforts had worn out the shortest probable time for such efforts—say one to two years—the soldiers of the Federal Army would have scattered home on furloughs. New enlistments would have been neglected in the hope of peace. The old enlistments would have expired. In a word, the military power of the Federal Government would have vanished. Disappointments, disgusts, and divisions would prevent raising another army. England and France would refuse to wait for the end of such folly, and would recognize the independence of the Confederacy. You would be beyond all question, master of the situation. Behold now the inevitable and exhaustless resources of our young military genius, our young Napoleon. He

does not fail in his letter of acceptance to look forward to this state of affairs. He has the courage to declare that "*the responsibility for ulterior consequences*" will fall on you! (Cheers.) Now, Mr. President, in a financial point of view, this result is as good as the other, Your war debt will need scaling and funding. The States now under the Federal Government may separate and fly apart. There will be scaling and funding North and South, East and West. The sky will be all luminous with new issues, old issues, and the like. Imagination fails to grasp the whole susceptibilities of the situation. I repeat that my heart is in the work—my heart, sir! [Striking his pockets again with both hands.] (Tremendous applause.)

You will please remember, my friends, that this interview is imaginary. The Convention was not held in Richmond but in Chicago; I leave you to judge whether Mr. Davis could have objected to having it in Richmond. All the newspapers from the Confederacy indicate that their hope, and pretty much their only hope, is in the success of the Chicago nominations. They indicate as much feeling in that direction as I have imputed to Mr. Davis. In the nature of the case they must be expected to. On the other side, we have the statements of Grant, Burnside, Hooker, and great numbers of our officers and soldiers, that all we need for perfect success is a united North. Reason confirms this opinion. The Rebellion is holding out in great hope that the Chicago politicians will succeed.

I put the question some time ago, which side of this war the Chicago movement was intended to help and encourage. If I mistake not, you are now able to answer that question. The leading rebels tell us, and no doubt, truly, that they are at work to establish the independence of the Confederation and make the dissolution of the Union permanent. To this end, they make no concealment of their anxiety to prevent the continuance in power of the present Administration. It is with them a primary object that Mr. Lincoln should be defeated. The Chicago men tell us that their object is to preserve the Union, but they choose the same means to preserve it which the rebels rely upon for its destruction. The motives of the two are matters of inference; but the means resorted to are matters of fact, and are identical. The *result* of the thing done is in the future, but for the present, the Chicago men and the rebellion are jointly striving to do the same thing. (Loud cheers.)

My friends, I have detained you a long time. I will only add, that there is no danger of the success of the Chicago ticket. We have no need to borrow trouble concerning it. It is helpless. (Cheers.) That truculent, noisy, multitudinous host, threatening peace to the enemies of their Government; threatening war on their Government itself, where is it now? The people have already breathed upon it as the Angel of Death breathed upon the hosts of Senacherib. By the use of appliances and means, known to political artificers, they may, and they will, from time to time, produce some abnormal rolling of the eyes, some galvanic jerks and twitches of the muscles, some looks of fierceness and grimace; but for all the purposes of patriotism; for all the purposes of political power; for all the purposes of public duty; for all the purposes of popular favor at the polls, that host is already and irrevocably dead. For all such purposes it is without voice.

"The tents are all silent; the banners alone;  
The lances unlifted; the trumpet unblown!"

[The speaker retired amidst prolonged cheers and applause.]

*"The Union it must be Preserved!"  
The Country above Party.*

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